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We estimate the bad loan rate in Japan and Korea for
1973-1992 using data on defaults on notes issued by the
corporate sector. This method exploits institutional fea-
tures common in both countries which suggest a close
linkage between default on notes and default on bank
borrowing. Our main findings are as follows. First, the
pattern of the estimated bad loan rate series generally
conforms topastbusiness cyclepatterns inbothcountries.
Second, the bad loan rate is substantially higher in Korea
than Japan. Lastly, a much tighter linkage is observedfor
Japan between the bad loan rate and a set ofplausible
economic explanatoryvariables. Weoffersomeinterpreta-
tionfor thesefindings.
Exploring the links between a country's financial system
anditsrealeconomicperformancehasbeen anincreasingly
active research area in recent years. One strand of the
literature hasfocusedparticularlyonJapan's bank-centered
financial system and within it, the role of the so-called
main banks in attenuating capital market imperfections
and hence supporting rapid growth (e.g., Hoshi, et al.,
1990, 1991). Morerecently,interest hasextended toinclude
other rapidly growing economies in the region, such as
Korea and Taiwan (e.g., World Bank 1993).
One puzzle thatemergesfromthis literature is that, fora
subset of East Asian countries at least, which includes
Japan, rapid growth occurred alongside a financial system
that many would describe as "repressed;" that is, interest
rates were strictly controlled and capital markets were
segmented both domestically and vis-a-vis international
transactions. In other words, these countries' experience
seems to contradict the received wisdom that financial
repression impairs efficient accumulation andallocationof
financial resources and hence retards economic growth.
Was financial repression indeed costless? This paper
tackles this question by indirectly assessing the cost
of financial repression by comparing Japan and Korea.
Although Korea clearly has followed Japan in terms of
economic development, both countries experienced rapid
investment-led growth spearheaded byheavyandchemical
industries-Japan in the early 1960s and Korea in the
1970s-andgrowthwasfinancedbyabank-centered finan-
cial system within an environment of segmented capital
markets and regulated interest rates. The notable dif-
ference, however, is that Korea's banks, as government-
owned institutions, were much more stringently regulated
than Japanese banks, which have been privately owned.
This affords an opportunity to assess whether this greater
degree of regulation of banks in Korea has engendered
greater costs or inefficiencies.
Tothe extent that industrial financinghas been virtually
the exclusive preserve of banks in both countries until
recently,we propose to assess the relative efficiency of the
two systems byfocusingonthebad loanrate. Therationale





NOTE: DataforJapanarefromthe1990 year-end consolidated balance
sheets of96,758 firms in all industries, withaggregate assetsof¥337
trillion.Korea's datacomefromthe1990 year-end consolidated balance
sheets of2081 manufacturing firms,withaggregateassetsof163trillion
won.
meet their external financing requirements through bank
borrowing haveresorted to the issue of short-termnotes to
raise additional liquidity. In Japan, notes have been used
relatively more intensively bythe small and medium-sized
firms, while in Korea, perhaps reflectingmore widespread
and severe credit rationing, use of notes payable appears
Ubiquitous across the corporate sector. Within Japanese
corporate groupings (keiretsu), major firms have been
providing de facto financing to smaller firms (typically
subcontractors) by selling longer-term notes, while paying
their own bills on a short-term basis (Aoki 1984).Another
common reason for the intensive use of notes in Japan and
Koreais thelack ofadevelopedcorporate bondorcommer-
cial paper market until recently.
Although time series data are not available for nonper-
forming bank loans, they are available (at a monthly
frequency) for the amount of notesdefaulted forboth Japan
and Korea. We propose that these note default data may be
an unbiased indicator of the financial health of the corpo-
rate sector and, by implication, the extent of the bad loan
problem in the banking sector. The reasoning becomes
evident as we examine how the notes are issued, dis-
counted, and cleared in both countries.
In Korea, firms typically issue notes on a standardized
check drawn on an account at a bank with which it has






























Measuring the bad loan rate directly is difficult for at least
two reasons. First, continuous data are not available be-
cause neither Japanese nor Korean banks are required by
law to report nonperforming loans. Second, for Korea,
even in instances where patchy data exist, banks arebound
to understate severely the true amount, since banks fre-
quently have been required to retain nonperforming loans
on their books instead of writing.them off by drawing on
loan loss provisions.'
Wepropose to circumvent data problems onbanks' (i.e.,
the lenders') balance sheets by turning to the (aggregate)
balance sheet of the corporate sector (i.e., the borrowers).
This indirect method of estimating the extent of badloans
exploits a salient feature of corporate finance common to
both economies: the extensive use of notes and accounts
payable (henceforth, notes), which are essentially very
liquid short-termfinancinginstruments. Whythesedataare
useful for the stated purpose requires some elaboration.2
Table 1 shows that notesconstitute a significant shareof
the liabilities ofboth Korean and Japanese firms. For the
Korean manufacturing sector as a whole, notes accounted
for about 27 percent of current liabilities and 17percent of
total liabilities in 1990, while the share of short-term bank
borrowing was 33.5 percent and 20.6 percent, respec-
tively. The reliance on notes is even higher in Japan, at 30
percent of total liabilities, compared to 16.7 percent for
short-term bankborrowing-.The share of notesin Japanese
corporate liabilities is more than double the levelobserved
in the U.S.
One important reason for the relatively heavy use of
notes, especially in Korea, has been the chronic excess
demand for funds in the corporate sector. Firms unable to
II. ESTIMATING THE BAD LoAN RATE
industry will engendera lowerbad loan rate. A majorcon-
tribution of the paper is to derive an estimate of the bad
loan rate which is unavailable from published sources. To
anticipateakeyresultofthispaper, wefindthatthebadloan
problem has been unambiguously more severe in Korea
than in Japan. We attribute this difference to the lack of
discretion Korean banks have had in allocating funds and
their lower incentive to control bankruptcy risk through
screening and monitoring corporate borrowers.
1.TheBankofKoreacompensated thecommercial banksbyextending
variousformsof concessions. One commonmethodwaspayment of
interesttocommercial banksforreserve deposits theyheldatthecentral
bank, althoughthelawdidnotrequiresuchpayment. See Kwack and
Chung (1986).
2. Descriptions ofdataandtheirsources areprovided intheAppendix.20 FRBSF ECONOMIC REvIEW 1994,NUMBER 2
established creditworthiness through its business relation-
ship. The maturity ranges from three to six months and, as
a transferable security, the notes can be endorsed suc-
cessively by several firms and are widely used as a means
of payment in business transactions. Firms often sell the
notes directly to banks prior to maturity at adiscount, with
the amount of discount equivalent to the interest charge
that would accrue from the date of discount to the maturity
date. Essentially similar practices apply to Japan, where it
isestimated that about 25percent ofbank loantransactions
in Japan take the form of discounts of notes (BaIlon and
Tomita 1988).3The bulk of the notes are cleared through
clearinghouses which are managed as associate institu-
tions of the Bankers' Association.
Banks promptly reportnotesindefaultwhenfunds in the
firm's account are insufficient to coverthe amount submit-
ted for clearance. In Japan, firms that default twice within
six months are subject to two years' prohibition from
transactions with member financial institutions of the
clearinghouse (Suzuki 1980: p.301). In Korea, although a
firm with "insufficient funds" is not legally bankrupt, for
practical purposes such a default almost always leads the
bank to suspend business and in severecases puts the firm
into receivership for liquidation.
Given that corporate banking in Japan and Korea com-
bines traditional lending activities with discounting and
clearing of notes, a suspension of bank transactions trig-
gered by a note default would imply that, from the bank's
point of view, the overall creditworthiness of the firm in
question has significantly deteriorated. In other words,
movements in aggregate suspension of bank transactions
due to notes defaults should be closely tied to the business
sector's general financial conditions and hence the extent
of the bad loan problem. It is also important to note that
sinceno government intervention constrains this reporting
procedure, note default data would not be fraught with the
underreporting bias of bad loans."
3. Notes are welcomed by the banks for two reasons: (i) they are self-
liquidating (on the due date they are settled and the money loaned is
automatically paid); (ii) when the original issuer is unable to meet the
note, all subsequent endorsers (collectively) are also liable to the bank
for the face value of the note (Kitagawa 1984).Japanese banks have an
added motive. In the process of clearing these notes, banks can collect
valuableup-to-date information on the general health of their corporate
clients.
4. Additionally, since the bank acts purely as an agent and not as a
fiduciary as in the case of loanarrangements, there is little scope or
incentive for the banks themselves to under or overreport the incidence
or the amount of note default.
BadLoan Estimate: Japan
To ascertain more formally the link between defaults on
notes and the severity of problem loans in the corporate
sector,.wefirst estimated a simple regression; the depend-
ent variable is (changes in) the aggregate liability of
bankrupt enterprises (BANKLIAB) and the explanatory
variable is (changes in) the aggregate liability of firms
whose business transactions with banks were suspended
due to note default (SUSPLIAB). 5 The results are reported
in Table 2. A high correlation is observed between these
two variables, with SUSPLIAB statistically significant at
the 1percent leveland explaining almost 90 percent of the
year-over-yearchanges in the aggregate liability of bank-
rupt firms.
We also regressed BANKLIAB on GNP growth instead
of SUSPLIAB to see the extent to which fluctuations in
aggregate growth explainchanges incorporate bankruptcy.
The coefficientonGNP is negative and statistically signifi-
cant; that is, higher output growth is associated with lower
corporate bankruptcy. However,GNP growthexplains only
38 percent of the changes in corporate bankruptcy. More-
over, its explanatory power does not appear robust. When
GNP and SUSPLIAB are both included as explanatory
variables, the former loses statistical significance while the
latter retains it.
Having established that SUSPLIAB provides a good
gauge of the corporate sector's overall financial health, we
now turn to the task of actually measuring the extent of the
bad loan problem in Japan. For any given quarter, t, we
estimatedthebad loanrate (BLR) byapplyingthefollowing
formula:




where BL is the level of bad loans, which is unobserved,
BB is the aggregate outstanding balance of short-term plus
long-term bank borrowing, TOTLIAB is the aggregate
liability of the corporate sector and, as before, SUSPLIAB
is the combined liability of firms with suspended business
transactions with banks due to defaulting on notes. The
intuition underlying this equation is straightforward:
The proportion of problem loans to total loans is the same
as the proportion of liabilities accounted for by firms with
suspended transactions with banks to the aggregate lia-
bility of all firms. The key underlying assumption, to
5. It would be reasonable to expect that movements in BANKRTLIAB
would closely track changes in the aggregate level of bad loans.
However,these data are available only on an annual basis.HUH AND KIM/BAD LoAN PROBLEMS IN JAPAN AND KOREA 21
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND SUSPENSIONS OF BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
WITH BANKS, JAPAN
1968.Q2~1992.Q4
DEPENDENT EXPLANATORY COEFFICIENT ADJUSTED D.W. P. VALUE
VARIABLE VARIABLE R2 OFQ
BANKRUAB SUSPUAB, 1.01*** 0.89 2.5 0.17
SUSPUAB,_1 0.43
BANKRUAB GNP, -0.98*** 0.38 1.9 0.75
GNP,_1 2.2




NOTE: BANKRLIAB isthetotalliabilityofthefirmsthatwentbankruptina givenyear, SUSPUAB is theaggregateliabilityoffirmswhosebusiness
transactions withbankshave beensuspendedduetodefaulting onnotes,andGNP istherealyear-over-yeargrowthrateofGNP. Allseriesarelogged
andfirstdifferenced; ***denotesa marginalsignificance level of 1percent.
reiterate, is that firms that default on notes are also likely
to be the ones defaulting on bank loans.6
Figure 1 presents the estimated bad loan rate (BLR) for
Japan for the sample period of 1973 to 1992.7 Three
noteworthy patterns emerge in the series. First, the bad
loan rate rose sharply during the 1970s. It first peaked in
1974 at about 1.5 percent, in the wake of monetary and
fiscal tightening in early 1973 geared to restrain inflation
and the October1973oil crisis. The rate rose to yethigher
levels in 1977, apparently reflecting the slump in export-
dependent industries triggered by a sharp appreciation of
the yen."
Second, the series does notexhibit any discernible trend
from the late 1970s through the mid-1980s. That is, no
marked increases in badloanproblems appearto havebeen
triggered by the second oil shock in 1979, the recession
oftheearly 1980s, orthe sharpappreciation of the yenafter
the Plaza Accord of 1985.
6. Ourestimatemightoverstate somewhat theactualmagnitude, to the
extentthat banks generally secureloanswithsometangibleassetand
recover someof the loanaftertheeventual liquidation.
7. Oursamplebeginsin1972andnotearlierbecausetheBankofJapan
changed the reporting criteria for note defaultin October 1971. See
Economic Statistics Monthly, November 1971.
8. The yen/dollar exchange rate appreciated from about 290 at the
beginning of 1977,to a peakof 170in October1978.
FIGUREl
BAD LoAN RATE ESTIMATE: JAPAN
Percent
o I I I I I I i I
73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 9122 FRBSFECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
Third, the bad loan rate declined markedly during the
bull market (the so-called bubble economy) of the second
halfofthe1980s, reaching a lowof 0.25 percent at the end
of1989. Therate then sharplyreversedtrend, soaringto an
all-time high of nearly 2 percent in 1991. This surge
coincides with the steep decline in asset prices since late
1989 and the onset of Japan's current recession, which
many now consider the most severein the postwar period.
Our estimate of the bad loan problem corroborates this
view in a striking way. The severity of problem loans
appears to have subsided somewhat in 1992but no defini-
tive statement can be made without more up-to-date data.
It is important to note that our estimates are of new bad
loan rates foreach year.Tothe extent that banks may carry
some or even a substantial part of bad loans from previous
periods over time, the actual bad loan rate may be better
approximated by a cumulative measure. To explore this
possibility, we cumulated the bad loan estimate from
1990.Ql to 1992.Q4, the latest period for which data are
available.Therationale forthis experiment isto seehowse-
vere thecurrent bad loanproblemisinJapan, assuming that
banks have not been able to write off any portion of
nonperforming loans since 1990.9 According to this worst
possible scenario, bad loans in Japan would have totaled
some ¥43.8 trillion, or 10.4 percent of total outstanding
(short-term plus long-term) bank loans at the end of 1992.
This estimate is remarkably close to some private sector
estimates reportedin thefinancialpress inrecent months. 10
BadLoan Estimate: Korea
Due to the lack of data on liabilities of suspended firms
(SUSPLIAB), the bad loan rate for Korea was estimated
using a slightly different equation:
K_ (BLt ) _ ( DEFNOTEt )





where DEFNOTEis the aggregate valueof defaulted notes
and TOTNOTE is the total amount of notes outstanding.
9. According to Japanese practices, loans are not considered delinquent
until sixmonths without a payment, and eventhen a bank may accept a
token payment, so the troubled debt may ride another six months. The
implicit assumption here is that prior to 1990, Japanese banks were
capable ofwritingoffbad loans. The situation changedaftertheonset of
the steep decline in asset prices; it wiped out a significant portion of
banks' hidden reserves, which otherwise could havebeen used to write
offbad loans. Forfurther details on the effect of stockprice movements
on Japanese bank capital and lending, see Kim and Moreno (1994).
10. Many financial analysts maintain that, by U.S. standards, total bad
loans in Japan may be as high as ¥30trillion. See WallStreetJournal,
January 20, 1994.
The equation simply states that the bad loan rate is equal to
the rate of default on notes issued.n ,12 Again, as in Japan,
this method of estimating the bad loan rate rests on the
premise that firms that default on notes also are likelyto be
the ones defaulting on bank loans.
Figure 2A showstheestimated bad loan rate forKorea.13
Several noteworthy patterns emerge. First, Korea's bad
loan rate is significantly higher than Japan's estimate-
typically more than double-andis also more volatile. We
will discuss possible reasons for this in Section III.
Second, as in Japan, a local peak in bad loans occurred
after the first oil shock. Unlike Japan, however, the bad
loan problem appears to havebeen most severeintheearly
1980s, with the rate exceeding 7 percent at its peak in 1981
-1982. This surge in bad loans can be reconciled with sev-
eral adverse shocks to the Korean economy around that
time. Forone,Korea'sGNP shrank byalmost 5percent as a
result of the drought-induced recession of 1980. Weak
domestic economic conditions were compounded by the
world recession after the second oil shock, pushing many
highly leveraged firms into insolvency. 14
Third, as in Japan, the bad loan rate trended downward
in the second half of the 1980s, though in Korea's case the
decline was punctuated by a minor surge in 1987. This
surge coincides with the well-knownepisode in 1987when
many Korean construction companies went bankrupt as a
result of cancellations of large overseas contracts.
11.The Bank of Korea's Financial StatementAnalysisdoes not provide
data on notes issued for all industries. We therefore estimated TOT-
NOTEbysumming notesissued inmanufacturing, construction, whole-
sale, retail, and electricity. These industries collectively accounted for'
about 90 percent of total corporate bank borrowing. By contrast,
DEFNOTEdata pertain to defaulted notes in all industries. Therefore,
our estimate of the default rate on notes has a slight upward bias.
12. As noted earlier, unlike other forms of liability, such as bank
borrowing, bad notes are netted out of total notes outstanding (TOT-
NOTE) quite promptly.Weadded DEFNOTEto the denominator since
dividing by TOTNOTEalone, which is a net amount, would yield an
overestimate of the extent of the bad loan rate.
13~ The sample begins in 1973 because of limited data availability for
earlier years and a sharp break in the data due to the Presidential
Emergency Decree in 1972.The Decree essentially came inresponse to
widespread financial distress in the corporate sector in the early 1970s.
To lighten the corporate debt burden, the government placed a mora-
torium on all loans in the informal credit market (curb market) and
slashed the bank loan rate from 23 percent per annum to 15.5 percent,
when the inflation rate was as high as 16 percent. The Decree also
converted approximately 30 percentof high interest rate short-term
commercial bank loans into long-term loans at concessional rates.
14. Industries that were particularly hard hit during this time included
overseas construction, shipping, textile machinery, and lumber. Con-
cern over unemployment and financial instability promptedthe govern-
ment to bailoutmany ofthesetroubled firms. See Cho and Kim (1993)
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Finally, as in Japan, Korea's bad loan rate increased
sharply in 1990, reaching a level comparable to that ob-
served in the early 1980s. Part of the increase may be
attributed to the cyclical downturn in the Koreaneconomy
in 1992, when GNP growth slowedto 4.6percent. But the
cyclical downturn alone cannot account for the jump in
the bad loan rate. Forone, the slowdownin 1992,albeit the
worst since 1980, was relatively mild compared to the
recession of 1980, or to Japan's current recession. More-
over,theKorean economyhas notbeen plagued byadrastic
asset price deflation as in Japan. These observations sug-
gestthat the recent surge in Korea's bad loan problem may
reflect more fundamental factors;which we explore in the
next two sections of the paper. .
Wenoted earlierthat our estimated series, which are net
annual rate, may significantly understate the actual extent
of the bad loan problem if banks are constrained in writing
them off in a timely manner. This discrepancy is likely to
be especially sizeable in Korea since, under government
directives, banks usually havebeen carrying large amounts
of nonperforming loans on their books over very long
periods.
Figure 2B presents the cumulative bad loan rate under
twoalternative scenarios. First, wederived anupper bound
estimate using an average annual write-off rate of 5 per-
cent, i.e., we cumulated 95 percent of new bad loans each
yearovertheentire sampleperiod1973.Q1-1992.Q4. This
series is represented by the solid line in Figure 2B. To
derive a lower bound estimate, we employed an arbitrary
average annual write-off rate of 10percent. This series is
represented by the dotted line.
According to the upper bound estimate, the cumulative
bad loan rate climbed steadily from the early 1970s to a
peak of 36.7 percent in 1984.Q1. The situation eased
somewhatduring the balance of the 1980s, but then deteri-
orated sharply after 1990.Q3. As of 1992.Q4, some 36.7
percent of total outstanding loans in Korea were nonper-
forming. Carrying out the same exercise using the annual
write-off rate of 10 percent yields essentially a similar
pattern, though the estimated cumulativerate is, ofcourse,
lower, at 26.5 percent in 1983.Q4 and 27.1 percent in
1992.Q4. By either measure, however, the bad loan prob-
lemin Koreaappears significant both in absolute terms and
relative to Japan.
Are these high bad loan rates indeed plausible? Chung's
(1991) study, which is based on internal Bank of Korea
data, allows a partial check for the benchmark year of
1988. For purposes of comparison, Table3 reproduces his
FIGURE2A FIGURE2B
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TarAL CREDIT PERFORMING loANS NONPERFORMING loANS BY TYPE
AND DISCOUNT TypeA TypeB Total
Amount % Amount % Amount %
5,502 4,041 335 6.1 1,125 20.5 1,461 26.5
447 401 3 0.6 43 9.6 46 10.2
5,949 4,443 338 5.7 1,168 19.6 1,507 25.3
SOURCE: Chung(1991Table1-1,p. 16).
NOTE:.Dataotherthanpercentareinbillionwon.TypeA referstoloansthatarealmostsurelynotrecoverable; TypeBareloanswithoverthreemonth's
delayillpaymentor loansto firmswithsufficientdeterioration in creditqualityto warrantexplicitloanprincipalrecovery measures.
main results. Chung's sample consists of eight major
nationwide banks divided into two groups. Group I con-
sists of sixbanks that havebeen in business sincethe 1950s
or 1960s, and Group II is made up of two newer banks
established in the early 1980s. Problem loans also are
reported in two categories. TypeA are loans whoseproba-
bility of repayment is virtually nil, and Type B includes
loans with over three months' delay in payment and loans
extended to companies whose credit conditions havedete-
riorated so markedly as to warrant explicit loan principal
recovery measures.
Based onthe strictest definition (i.e., TypeA), some5.7
percent of the total sample of eight banks' outstanding
loans as of year-end 1988 were bad loans. When the
broaderdefinitionofproblemloans areadded (TypeB),the
badloan rate swells to 25.3 percent. Thebad loan problem
appearssignificantlymore severeforGroup Ibanks, which
are older and hence more exposed to bad loan overhang
problems. Bycontrast, Group IIbanks havehadthebenefit
of a relatively clean slate. These newer banks, however,
cannot be taken as representative of Korea's banking
industry.
Our estimates of the cumulative bad loan rate appear
reasonably close to Chung's. As of 1988.Q4, our bad loan
rate was 17.9 percent using the 10 percent write-off rate
and 30.2 percent using the 5 percent write-off rate. It
would appear,therefore, that for1988atleast, the (broadly
measured) actual bad loan rate falls between the lowerand
upper bounds of our cumulative estimate. We have no
reason to believe that this should not hold for other years
as well.
m. WHY HAVE BAD LoAN RATES
BEEN HIGHER IN KOREA?15
The modemtheory of financial intermediation emphasizes
the special role of banks as information producers. By
acting as delegated monitors on behalf of numerous and
scattered depositors, banks eliminate needless duplication
ofmonitoring whichiscostly (Diamond 1984).Also, given
the public goods aspect ofmonitoring, delegating the task
to.one intermediary potentially can help avoid the free-
rider problem that arises when many lenders finance a
single borrower. We say potentially because, as Diamond
pointed out, banks themselves must be provided with
proper incentives to monitor. Depositor discipline is one
incentive against banks that shirk on monitoring.16 An-
other is for the bank to hold a substantial share of a
borrower's debt sothat it internalizes a substantial portion
of the externality generated by its monitoring.
15. The mean bad loanrate estimatefor the sampleperiod 1973.QI-
1992.Q4 was 3.9 percent for Koreaand 0.9 percentfor Japan, with
standarddeviations of1.5percentand0.4 percent,respectively. Tosee
whetherthedifference betweenthetwoestimatesisdifferentfromzero
withastatisticalsignificance, thefollowing testswerecarriedout.First,
the difference between the two series (i.e., diff, = BLR(Korea) -
BLR(Japan) is calculated. Second, various univariate autoregressive
regressions witha constanttermarerunusingthediffr series.Thenthe
statistical significance of the constant term is examined. For AR(I)
throughAR(6) specifications, the constanttermremainspositiveand
significant at the significance level of 10percentor less.
16.Totheextentthatabankholdsadiversifiedloanportfolio,itsoverall
returnwillserveasarelativelynoiseless signalofthelevelofmonitoring
effort. This, in tum, enables depositors to induce banks to monitor
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Both Japan and Korea have relied intensively on the
banking sector to finance growth. The banking sector's
incentive structure to screen and monitor borrowers, how-
ever, appears to have diverged significantly between the
two countries.
For Japan, a large number of studies suggest that its
banking system, in particular the so-called main banking
system, has been highly effective in mitigating informa-
tional and other imperfections in capital markets (e.g.,
Aoki, et al., 1993, Hoshi, et al., 1990, 1991, Kim 1993,
and Lichtenberg and Pushner 1992). A distinguishing
feature of the main banking system is that although the
main bank identified with a particular firm that is not its
sole lender, it is usually the only bank that undertakes the
task of monitoring. 17 Twoadditionalfeatures of the system
suggest that powerful incentives were present for the main
bank to be diligent in carrying out this task.
First, if a firm monitored by a given main bank faces
financial distress, that main bank is also expected to
assume the bulk of the burden in restructuring it or bailing
it out. If conditions are sufficiently bad to warrant bank-
ruptcy, the main bank usually absorbs a larger proportion
of losses than its loan share.l" Bearing this disproportion-
ate burden when projects go awry would act as an effective
deterrent against shirking on monitoring.l? Second, the
main bank also faces positive incentives to monitor due to
the claims structure it holds: The main bank typically not
only is the largest lender, but also is an important share-
holder, usually the largest among banks. Presumably, the
large debt and equity stakes that the main bank simultane-
ously holds help it internalize a significant part of the
externalities associated with monitoring the firm.20
As in Japan, banks have played a dominant role in
financing Korea's economic growth. This came about
largely as a result of conscious policy design. Following
Japan's model in the 1960s, the Korean authorities sought
to use the banking sector as a conduit of preferential credit
17. Mainbanking therefore hasbeen characterized bySheard(1989)asa
system of "delegated monitor among monitors," in contrast to Dia-
mond's (1984)model where monitoring is delegated bydepositorsto an
intermediary.
18. This is extensively documented in case studies by Sheard (1985,
1989).
19. This immediately raises the question: What preventsthe main bank
from reneging on this commitment? One possible explanation is that
banks enter into arrangements for reciprocal delegated monitoring as
well as for reciprocal subordination in financial distress, with loss of
reputation as a deterrent against defection (Aoki, et al., 1993).
20. Kim (1993) provides a more detailed analysis on this and related
issues.
to sectors deemed strategic to Korea's economic growth. 21
The use of preferential access to credit at subsidized
interest rates (known as "policy loans") intensified in the
1970swhen the government madeamajorpush to establish
a heavy and chemical industries (HCI) sector in Korea.22
According to one estimate, policy loans on average ac-
countedfor over 65 percentofall bankloans in 1973-1981
(Cho and Kim 1993). The actual share of government-
directed loans would be even higher if one included loans
that were not extended through explicitly earmarked pro-
grams and hence were more difficult to measure. 23
Compared to Japan, the Korean government appears to
have wielded a much more directcontrol and much tighter
control over the banking sector. Most notably, unlike in
Japan, the Korean government until recently has been the
major shareholderin all majorKorean banks. This has had
far-reaching ramifications on how the banking system has
operated. To quote Cho and Kim (1993, pp. 51-52): "The
banking system was used as the government's treasuryunit
to finance development projects to manage risk sharing of
the economy and bankers were treated as civil servants.
Their performance was evaluated based on their com-
pliance to the government guidance rather than their effi-
cient management of assets and liabilities."
Tight governmentcontrol ofthe banking sector gaverise
to two types of moral hazard problems in Korea's credit
markets. On the supply side, banks had little discretion or
incentive to control risk by screening projects and monitor-
ing corporate performance. Declaring any sizeable indus-
trial enterprise as bankrupt or writing off bad loans on
21. It was not until the early to mid-1980s when nonbank financial
institutions (NBFIs) emerged as an important alternative source of
financing in addition to the traditional commercial bank and curb
markets. For overviews of the postwar Korean financial system and
policies, see Kang (1990), Kwack and Chung (1986), Hong and Park
(1986), Cho and Kim (1993), and Cho and Cole (1992).
22. The government also used the banking system to guarantee foreign
financing of investments in HCI. Foreign loans accounted fora sizeable
share of external funds ofKorea's corporate business sector, averaging
37.9 percent ofthe total in 1965-1969, 23.3 percent in 1970-1974, and
20.4 percent in 1975-1979. As the capital-intensive HCI investment
drive waned and supplies of loans from foreign banks dwindled,
the share of foreign loans declined sharply to 6 percent in the firsthalf
of the 1980s.
23. Another wayto assess the relative importance of policy loans is to
look at the sectoral allocation of credit. According to Cho and Kim
(1993, p.39), the manufacturing sector received 46 percent of total
domestic bank loans in 1970, while its contribution to GDP was only
21.3 percent. Within manufacturing, HCI accounted for22.6percent of
total bank loans, while its GDP share was only 8.5 percent. By 1980,
HCI's share oftotal bank credit increased to 32.1 percent whileits GDP
share increased to 16.5 percent. This reflectsinpart the longergestation
period of HCI investment.26 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1994,NUMBER 2
banks' balance sheets required the explicit consent of the
government. In practice, the government averted bank-
ruptcy at large enterprises by directing banks to provide
reliefloans or rescheduling debt.
Extreme control and guidance of banking institutions
had adverse incentive effects on the demand side of the
loan market as well. The socialization of bankruptcy risk,
combined with the strict low interest rate ceilings, made
the cost of debt financing very cheap for firms in the
targeted sectors.24 This encouraged firmsto take onexces-
sivelyhigh levelsof debt. According to data in the Bank of
Korea's Financial Statement Analysis, the rate of total
liability to net worth in Korean manufacturing more than
quadrupled, from about 84 percent in the mid-1960s to
over 365 percent in the late 1970s.
High leveraging made the corporate sector as a whole
very vulnerable to external shocks and economic fluctu-
ations. This problem grew to especially alarming propor-
tions by the end of the 1970s, as excessive investment in
HCI bred large idle capacities, and enterprises began
encountering difficulties servicing their debt. 25 The gov-
ernmentresponded bytaking greaterinvolvementinbanks'
credit allocation to bailout troubled firms and industries,
with the result that banks were saddled with ever growing
amounts of de facto nonperforming loans.26
Mounting problems in the financial sector prompted the
Korean government to reorient its policies in the early
1980s toward giving banks greater discretion in setting
interestrates and allocating loans. Tothis end, the govern-
mentbegan divesting its shareholdingincommercial banks
and established the so-called principal transaction bank
system. Thesystemsoughttoregulate bankcredit extended
to large corporations through their principal transaction
banks. The basic aim wasto reduce corporate leverageand
to improve the quality of monitoring of the financial
conditions and investment activities of corporations. 27
Pervasive government control of the banking sector
persists, however. Interest rates at all banks are still reg-
ulated. Banks that are saddled with high proportions
of nonperforming loans continue to depend on the Bank of
24. According to Cho and Cole (1992), the real cost of bank credit was
negative throughout most of the 1970s.
25. Cho and Kim (1993) estimate that almost 80 percent of all fixed
investment in the manufacturing sector during the late 1970s was
directedto HCI. Many subscribeto the viewthat this wasan overinvest-
ment. See for example Hong (1979), Amsden (1989), and Stem et al.,
(1992).
26. The launch into HCI itself waspreceded bya major government bail
out of the corporate sector which already was highly leveraged. See
footnote 14.
27. See Nam and Kim (1993) for a detailed analysis of this system.
Koreaforlow-costfunds to support their outstanding loans,
the bulk of which are still policy-related. This has left
banks little choice but to heed government directives
even though they have nominally shifted to private owner-
ship (Cho and Cole 1992). Finally, an autonomous bank-
customer relationship has yet to develop in Korea due to
continued government intervention in credit allocation. As
a result, principal transactions banks havehad little incen-
tivetomonitorcorporations. Norhasaprincipal transaction
bank's evaluation of a corporate investment and financing
plan had any significant effect on corporate behavior (Nam
and Kim 1993).
To summarize, our review of the Japanese and Korean
banking system highlights a fundamental difference. In
Japan, thecost of corporate bankruptcyultimately fellonto
the (main) banks. The internalization of bankruptcy costs
would have induced banks to be diligent in controlling
bankruptcy risk through screening corporate borrowers as
well as investment projects. Additionally, as significant
corporate shareholders, Japanese banks also would have a
strong incentive to monitor corporate performance on an
ongoing basis. By contrast, these private incentives were
muted in Korean banks due to the government ownership
of banks until recently and due to continued heavy inter-
vention despite nominal privatization. Other things equal,
this lower incentive faced by Korean banks to monitor
undoubtedly accounts for a significant part of the higher
bad loan rate estimated for Korea.
I\Z DETERMINANTS OF THE BAD LoAN RATE
Our institutional explanation of the higher bad loan rate in
Korea assumes the usual ceteris paribus condition. This
section attempts a more systematic way to control for
factors other than different monitoring incentives that may
account for the observed difference in bad loan rates
between Japan and Korea. To implement this idea statis-
tically, we estimated the following regression,
n l
BLRt = at + j~l i~l 131xL + Et
where xi is a set of economic variables (with lag structure
denoted byI, 1=4forJapan, 1=6 forKorea)that plausibly
will affectthe bad loanrate in theeconomy. 28 Weestimated
three models. The first model consisted only of financial
variables derived from the aggregate balance sheet. For
both Japan and Korea, these variables were the aggregate
leverageratio of thecorporate sector,defined astheratio of
28. In addition to the variables listed in (1),the proper number of lagged
dependent variables were added to remove serial correlations. Also an
intercept dummy variable was added in the three equations for Japan toHUH AND KIM/ BAD LoAN PROBLEMS IN JAPAN AND KOREA 27
TABLE 4
EXCLUDED VARIABLES: Exclusion test: Ho: ~=O for all j's andj's
n 4
BLRt = at + j~l i~l ~1xL + Et
EXCLUSION TESTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES




























Variables Variables and Real
Only Drily Variables
j= 1,2,3 j=4,5,6,7,8 j= 1-8
ADJUSTEDR2
The regressions for Korea are reported in Table 5. One
immediately notes the significantly lower adjusted R2 in
Korea, ranging from 0.62 to 0.68. The exclusion test
corroborates the poor fit. In the first model, which is
restricted to financial variables, onlyleverageis significant
(at,the 5 percent level); the joint exclusion test statistic is
NOTE: The dependent variable BLR is the estimated bad loan rate. The
explanatory variables are: leverageratio (LEV), bank borrowing to total
liability ratio (BB), loan growth rate (LOANGR), Nikkei stock market
index (NIKKEl), real GDP growth rate (GDPGR), nominal yen-dollar
exchange rate (FOREX), oil price (OIL), and variability in industrial
production growth (IPVAR), defined as the standard deviation of the
quarterly industrial production growth rate over the immediately pre-
ceding three years. ForNIKKEI, FOREX, and OIL, we used year-over-
year growth rates. Four lags of all explanatory variables were used
except for IPVAR (one lag). To correct for serial correlation, the right-
hand-side also included the dependent variable lagged up to four
quarters. To control for the change in the Bank of Japan's reporting
procedure in 1971 on notes default data, we also included dummy
variables (not reported), with D = 1 for t=1968.Q1 to 1972.Q4, and












deflation and the current recession. Interestingly, the exclusion test for
the Nikkei was not statistically significant for this shorter sample
period, while that for the variability in industrial production was. The
main thrust of the results did not change, however.
total liabilities to total assets, the ratio of bank borrowing
in total liabilities, and the growth rate in bank loans. The
second model included "real" macroeconomic variables.
For Japan, the set consisted of the Nikkei stock market
index, real GDP growth rate, the nominal yen-dollar ex-
change rate, oil price, and the variability in industrial
production growth. The Koreanequation did notinclude a
stock market index and used the real instead of nominal
won-dollarexchange rate.29 Thethird model includedboth
sets of financial and real variables.
The motivation underlying this exercise is simple.If our
hypotheses on the behavior of Japanese and Koreanbanks
are correct, and if our estimate of the bad loan rate is
reasonably accurate, then we would expect the regression
equation to be statistically more significant in Japan com-
pared to Korea. The rationale is that because of lower
incentives facing Korean banks to control risk through
screening and monitoring corporate borrowers, the con-
ventional explanatory variables will explain less of the
movement in the Korean bad loan rate. Alternatively,one
can think of the adverse incentive effects on banks as
forcing the economy to operate inside the risk-return
efficiency frontier, thereby loosening the link between the
bad loan rate and the explanatory variables.
As evident inTable4whichreports theresultsforJapan,
the exclusion tests are generally significant for all three
models, with roughly 75 to 80 percent of changes in the
bad loan rate explained bythe right hand side variables. In
the model featuring financial variables alone, individual
exclusion tests spew that Ieverage and loan growth are
statistically significant in explaining changes in the bad
loanrate, while the rate ofbank borrowing to totalliability
is not. A joint exclusion test of the three balance sheet
variables, however, is significant at the 5 percent level.
Four out of the five variablesin the second model-the
Nikkei index, GDP growth, oilprice, and the variabilityin
industrial production-areall statistically significant. The
joint exclusion testofallfivereal macroeconomicvariables
is also significant at the I percent level. The third model
performs the best, suggesting that both financial and real
variables are relevant, and hence both sets should be
included.30
accountforthe level shift in the break:in the keydata at 1971.Q4.This is
done to allow for a major accounting rule change regarding suspension
and bankruptcy in late 1971.
29. This helps account for the much larger inflation differential that
prevailedbetween Korea and the U.S. than Japan and the U.S. Also, for
Korea, we did not include a stock market index variable because the
market was underdeveloped until at least the mid-1980s.
30. Wealso ran the same setofregressionslimiting the sampleperiod up
to the end of 1989, i.e., we excluded the period of the steep asset price28 FRBSF ECONOMIC REvIEW 1994, NUMBER 2
only marginallysignificant at0.10. Noneofthevariablesin
the secondmodel is statistically significant, either individ-
ually, or jointly. As was the case for Japan, combining the
two sets of variables does improve the result somewhat,
with the jointexclusion test for the financial variables sig-
nificant at 5 percent and that for all seven variables signif- -;
icant at 10percent. Overall, however,it is safe to say that
all models fare considerably less well for Korea.
TABLE 5
EXCLUSION TESTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
OF THE BAD LoAN RATE, KOREA
1973.Q1-1992.Q4
n 6






measure appears to be a reasonable approximation based
on several grounds. First, there is a general conformity
between the overall pattern of our measure to the past
business cycle patterns of the two economies. Although
the empirical relationship is weaker for Korea than for
Japan, the bad loanmeasure forKoreastill seemstobehave
in a reasonable manner following identifiable shocks.
Second, our estimate matches quiteclosely anindependent
study that measures the bad loan rate directly for Korea in
1988and 1989. Third, consistent with our expectation, the
bad loan rate estimate is substantially higher in Koreathan
in Japan. Finally, a much tighter linkage is observed be-
tween the bad loan rate estimates and a plausible set of
economic variables for Japan. These results, in tum, sug-
gest that while banks can make a substantial contribution
to economic growth, heavy government intervention also
can substantially impair banks' incentive to monitor and
control risk. The higher bad loan rate in Korea is but one
manifestation ofthe associated costs of "unduly" repress-
ing the banking system. Our estimate reveals, especially in
the case of Korea, that such costs can be substantial.
ApPENDIX
AoJUSTEDR2 0.63 0.62 0.68
EXCLUDED VARIABLES: Exclusiontest:Ho: 131= 0 for all j's andj's Data Sources
N. CONCLUSION
We attempted to measure the bad loan rate based on
indirect data forJapan and Korea to shed some light on the
implications of different institutional and risk-sharing ar-
rangements observed in the two economies. The estimated
NOTE: ThedependentvariableBLR is theestimatedbadloanrate.The
explanatory variables are:leverage ratio(LEV), bankborrowing tototal
liabilityratio (BB), loangrowthrate (LOANGR), realGDPgrowthrate
(GDPGR), real won-dollar exchange rate (RFX), oil price (OIL), and
variability in industrial production growth (IPVAR), defined as the
standarddeviation of quarterlyindustrialproduction growthrate over
the immediately preceding three years. Six lags of all explanatory
variables wereusedexceptfortheIPVAR (onelag).Tocorrectforserial































Data forJapan were collected fromthe Quarterly Reportof
Incorporated Enterprise Statistics, published by the Min-
istry of Finance (MOF). The Report provides aggregated
quarterly balance sheet data for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms, excluding financial institutions and
insurance companies. The sample consists of 1,850 firms
with capital inexcess of ¥10million, which would include
most of Japan's publicly listed firms, and 15,000 firms
drawn from various size groups below the ¥10 million
capital threshold. The Report therefore provides a fairly
comprehensive coverage of the entire spectrum of Japan's
corporate sector.
Data for Korea were collected from Financial Statement
Analysis, published annually bythe BankofKorea(BOK).
This data source is ideally suited for purposes of com-
parison with Japan since it is modeled closely after the
MOF Report both in its method of collection and the vari-
ables covered. The BOK's sample consists of some 1,400
firms with the number split roughly evenlybetween small
and large enterprises (listed or unlisted, with capital in
excess of WlO billion). One notable difference is that the
Korean data are only available on an annual basis. We
therefore estimated quarterly data series by interpolation
between two annual data points. Table 1 presents an
example of typical balance sheet data that are used.HUH AND KiM/BAD LoAN PROBLEMS IN JAPAN AND KOREA 29
Data on the default rates on the business notes and out-
standing loans were compiled from monthly issues of
Economic StatisticsMonthly (BOJ), and Monthly Statisti-
cal Bulletin (BOK). Monthly series were aggregated to
derive quarterly series (business note default) and end of
quarter (outstanding loan and discount) data.
Japanese data on notes payable are not reported separately
from accounts payable in MOF's Quarterly Report of
Incorporated Enterprise Statistics. We estimated notes
payable by using aggregate corporate sector balance sheet
data which reportthese items separately.Wecomputed the
ratio between the two and multiplied ittotheMOP series to
arrive at an estimate of notes payable.
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